Wer entscheidet über die Zukunft:
Warum Schuldenregeln eine Frage der Demokratie sind?
31 aout 2026
Public debt is usually debated as a matter of economic expediency, but it is equally a question of democratic rule, since unconstrained borrowing lets present majorities bind future ones without their consent. Drawing on ordoliberal thought and comparing Germany, Switzerland, and France, this essay argues that debt rules function as instruments of democratic self-binding, protecting accountability, transparency, and intergenerational fairness against short-term political incentives; Switzerland's constitutionally entrenched and popularly approved debt brake shows this can succeed, while France's lack of such a rule illustrates the democratic risks of unconstrained borrowing. The essay concludes that a sound debt rule expresses not distrust of democracy but respect for those who cannot yet vote.
Der Stabilitats- und Wachstumspakt nach der Reform 2024:
Multi-Level Governance zwischen ordoliberalen Defizitregeln und nationaler Haushaltspolitik in Frankreich und Deutschland
10 mars 2026
This paper examines how the 2024 reform of the Stability and Growth Pact produces different fiscal adjustment strategies in France and Germany. It argues that the reform retains the EU's ordoliberal emphasis on fiscal discipline, debt sustainability, and common rules, while adding greater flexibility through medium-term national plans and investment-related adjustment periods. France primarily uses this flexibility to support investment, reindustrialisation, and European sovereignty, whereas Germany prioritises rule compliance, fiscal credibility, and long-term sustainability. The comparison shows that EU multi-level governance accommodates divergent national fiscal priorities within a shared institutional framework.